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Skills, knowledge and senior managers’ demonstrations of safety commitment 
Abstract 
Senior managers’ safety commitment is emphasised in the safety literature as a crucial 
influence on organisational safety.  Yet there is little understanding of the characteristics that 
underpin their ability to engage in behaviours that demonstrate safety commitment.  This study 
investigates the contribution of problem-solving, social competence and safety knowledge to 
such behaviours.  Senior managers (N=60) from European and North American air traffic 
management organisations participated in interviews consisting of open questions designed to 
trigger safety knowledge and descriptions of behaviours that demonstrate safety commitment 
as well as scenarios designed to trigger problem-solving and social competence.  Reliable 
scores were generated through systematic scoring procedures involving two independent 
coders.  The results indicated that problem-solving, namely the number of issues and 
information sources considered when understanding problems and generating ideas to solve a 
problem were positively related to demonstrations of safety commitment.  The ability to 
perceive others was also found to correlate with safety commitment, whereas safety knowledge 
was not associated with behaviours that demonstrate safety commitment.  It is proposed that 
training and guidance designed for senior managers should focus on their problem-solving 
abilities and perception of others in order to support them in demonstrating safety commitment. 
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Skills, knowledge and senior managers’ demonstrations of safety commitment 
As leaders of organisations, senior managers crucially contribute to organisational safety 
(Michael, Evans, Jansen & Haight, 2005).  Reviews of the safety climate literature (Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor & Bryden, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000, 2007; Shannon, Mayr & Haines, 
1997) identified ‘management’ and their attitudes and behaviours as one of the most frequently 
measured safety climate factors.  The predominant attribute deemed to be crucial for 
management’s influence on organisational safety in the literature is their safety commitment.  
Neal and Griffin (2004) define management’s safety commitment as “the extent to which 
management is perceived to place a high priority on safety and communicate and act on safety 
issues effectively” (p. 27).  Two meta-analyses report management commitment to safety as 
not only the most frequently measured, but also one of the most influential organisational 
factors for safety performance and injuries (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010; Christian, 
Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009).   
Studies measuring safety commitment have construed this concept as reflected in five 
aspects of management action.  These are managers’ decision- and policy-making (Andriessen, 
1978; Cohen, 1977; DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson Vandenberg & Butts, 2004; Warack & Sinha, 
1999; Zohar & Luria, 2005) and their active involvement and communication with the 
workforce (Cohen, 1977; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Harper, Coredery, de Klerk et al., 
1996; O’Toole, 2002; Simard & Marchand, 1997; Warack & Sinha, 1999; Zohar & Luria, 
2005).  Other studies have focused on management‘s influence on organisational practices 
(Hansez & Chmiel, 2010; Yule, Flin & Murdy, 2007; Zacharatos, Barling & Iverson, 2005) 
and their safety values (Griffin & Neal., 2000; Rundmo & Hale, 2003) as reflecting safety 
commitment.   
The theme of safety commitment also appears alongside ineffective leadership, lack of 
appreciation of responsibility for safety and a lack of feedback and continuous reinforcement 
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from the top, as senior managerial contributions to accidents in investigation reports (Baker, 
2007; BFU, 2004; Sheen, 1987).  Most recently, the President’s report (2011) on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon accident in April 2010, which killed 11 people and caused substantial costs 
and environmental damages states: “The critical common element is an unwavering 
commitment to safety at the top of an organization: the CEO and board of directors must create 
the culture and establish the conditions under which everyone in a company shares 
responsibility for maintaining a relentless focus on preventing accidents.” (p. 218). 
Senior managers are generally under-researched in the leadership (Zaccaro & Horn, 2003) 
and safety literature (Flin, 2003).  Although leadership at lower organisational levels has been 
studied extensively, such insights are not always applicable to the senior level, where 
positions differ crucially from lower levels (Hambrick, 1989) and managers at this level are 
likely to have a distinct influence on safety (Clarke, 1999).  Accordingly, a need for research 
involving senior managers exists.   
The majority of research on managers’ safety commitment has approached this concept as 
an expression of concern for safety that is reflected in behaviours, with a particular focus on 
how employees perceive these behaviours.  Such a conceptualisation underlies managerial 
safety commitment as a central component of safety climate or culture.  However, the 
perception through the eyes of employees is only one upward perspective on the concept of 
safety commitment.  In fact, very little empirical work has investigated what attributes a 
senior manager possesses that may influence these demonstrations of commitment to safety.  
Because safety commitment is highlighted as so central to this group’s influence on 
organisational safety, this angle not only offers new theoretical insights but also 
understanding of practical relevance for the selection and training of senior managers.  
Consequently, this study investigates the contribution of two skills, problem-solving and 
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social competence, as well as safety knowledge, to the capability of senior managers to show 
their commitment to safety.   
This investigation involves senior managers working in air traffic management (ATM).  
ATM is provided by Air Navigation Service Providers whose employees’ guide airplanes at 
airports and en-route to ensure traffic safety and efficiency.  In increasingly busy airspaces, 
these organisations contribute towards flying being one of the safest ways to travel (EASA, 
2010).  Studying senior managers in this environment enables insights from a group that 
works at the upper end of the reliability distribution of organisations.   
1.1 Skills, knowledge and safety commitment  
A focus on skills and knowledge as determinants of behaviours that can indicate safety 
commitment follows the senior management research’s emphasis on individual characteristics 
as most appropriate to understand this group’s influence on organisations (Day & Lord, 1988; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  The consideration of problem-solving, social competence and 
safety knowledge was guided by the skills-based leadership model (Mumford, Zaccaro, Hardin 
& Fleishman, 2000) and the specific literature outlined below.   
Problem-solving has been defined (Brophy, 1998) as the process of working towards a 
goal when the means to get there are not known.  According to Isaksen and Treffinger (2004), 
this consists of three stages: understanding the problem, generating ideas and planning the 
implementation of ideas.  In line with descriptions of strategic work (David, 2001), senior 
managers will especially engage in the first two stages of the problem-solving process in their 
work, whereas the actual implementation of ideas will be delegated to others.  Consequently, 
senior managerial problem-solving is most likely to crucially contribute to their safety 
commitment with respect to these two stages.  First, the way management approaches safety 
problems, is proposed to function as a frame of reference for organisational members, which 
goes on to reflect senior management’s commitment to safety (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  A 
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manager who is able to engage with safety related problems effectively, from many angles 
and aims to gain a deeper understanding of such problems by using multiple information 
sources, is likely to make decisions that will affect safety positively.  Consequently, his or her 
interest in safety will be evaluated by the workforce as reflecting commitment to safety.  
Secondly, the ideas a senior manager generates to solve safety problems will shape an 
organisation’s work conditions (e.g. equipment, staffing level, training, awareness 
campaigns), which are likely to be used as proxies for the manager’s safety commitment by 
the workforce (e.g. Hansez & Chmiel, 2010).  Accordingly, it can be proposed that the skill 
of a senior manager to engage with safety problems effectively will support him or her in 
showing behaviours that reflect commitment to safety. 
Baron and Markman (2000) define social competence as consisting of perceiving others, 
being able to adapt in social situations, express one’s opinion, to persuade others and to be able 
to induce positive reactions in others.  Personable communication of senior managers with the 
workforce is frequently emphasised as a powerful vehicle for senior managers to convey their 
safety message (e.g. Harper et al., 1996).  Site visits have been suggested as benefitting from 
high levels of social competence as these provide an opportunity to demonstrate the managers' 
commitment to safety (Hopkins, 2011). 
Two aspects of social competence can be highlighted as being relevant for investigating 
senior managerial influence on safety: social perception and persuasion.  Gardner and Stough 
(2002) emphasise the ability to understand the emotions of others as being among the strongest 
predictors of senior managers’ effectiveness and this has also been highlighted for the influence 
on safety (Hopkins. 2011).  A senior manager’s ability to show active involvement and 
communicate effectively will be facilitated by their social perception skills.  Persuasion can 
also be particularly relevant for the management of safety, as safety is an abstract goal, for 
which indicators are not easily defined (Hale, 2009).  According to goal setting theory (Locke 
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& Latham, 1990) safety is a difficult goal to drive individuals towards suggesting the ability to 
persuade others of the importance of safety contributes to a manger’s safety commitment.   
Based on the definition of knowledge in the Oxford Online Dictionary, we conceptualise 
safety knowledge as consisting of facts and information, theoretical and practical 
understanding, awareness gained by experience as well as background and education in 
relation to safety.  Finkelstein (1992) evaluates expertise and knowledge as one of the main 
tenents of senior managerial power.  To show commitment to safety, a senior manager is 
likely to require high levels of safety knowledge to act appropriately in relation to safety 
matters and to communicate related facts to the workforce.  Safety knowledge can enable a 
senior manager to understand safety related information and to draw meaningful conclusions 
from it, which can guide demonstrations of safety commitment.   
Accordingly, we suggest that problem-solving (consisting of understanding problems and 
generating ideas), social competence (consisting of perceiving others and persuasion) and 
safety knowledge will be relevant for a senior manager’s capability to demonstrate safety 
commitment.  We investigate the relationships of these skills and knowledge with behaviours 
through which senior managers can show their safety commitment.  
2. Method 
2.1 Sample 
A total of 60 senior managers from 11 air navigation service providers in Europe (10) and 
North America (1) were interviewed (response rate 79%).  The sample consisted of senior 
managers, either CEOs, direct reports to CEOs or board members (e.g. safety managers, 
director of operations, head of engineering, head of ATM, head of HR, head of finance and 
others).  The participating organisations covered a broad geographical and cultural range, as 
well as types of airspaces and different traffic levels (e.g. average number of flights handled 
daily ranged from 254 to 6500; EUROCONTROL, 2006).  Average time in position was 50 
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months (SD = 51.12 months, ranging from 0.5 months to 240 months).  ATM is organised 
nationally and there is usually one organisation in each country providing air navigation 
services, some of which are state owned.  Although a highly reliable industry, ATM faces 
incidents that can have severe consequences.  Typical incidents are unauthorised penetrations 
of the airspace (infringements), aircraft deviation from ATM clearance, separation minima 
infringement (i.e. loss of separation of airplanes), runway incursion and inadequate aircraft 
separation (EASA, 2010).   
2.2 Interview and procedures 
Participants were recruited through EUROCONTROL’s Safety Culture Programme 
Manager.  Following agreement to participate, two interviewers visited each organisation to 
carry out structured interviews.  The majority of interviews were carried out face-to-face in 
the participant’s office or a designated room and four interviews were carried out over the 
phone.  Average interview duration was 46 minutes (range 17 to 90 minutes).  The structured 
interviews consisted of open questions and scenarios.  
Safety commitment. Safety commitment was assessed through an open question (see 
Appendix).  The number of behaviours that participants reported was evaluated as reflecting 
their repertoire of behaviours.  Awareness of different behaviours allows individuals to react 
flexibly to a range of situations and has been proposed as supporting leaders’ effectiveness 
(Zaccaro, Gilbert, Thor & Mumford, 1991).  Accordingly, a more varied understanding of 
behavioural options is proposed to enable a senior manager to show safety commitment in 
various ways, allowing him or her to be more effective.  The behaviours were identified based 
on the definition of safety commitment by Neal and Griffin (2004) and counted using rules by 
Dean, Hender, Rodgers and Santanen (2006).  Interrater reliability (ICC; McGraw & Wong, 
1996) for the safety commitment rating was .80.   
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Additionally, the content of the safety commitment descriptions was explored using content 
analysis (Mayring, 2000).  Two raters, who were not involved in the previous analysis of the 
safety commitment responses, were provided with definitions of the five behaviours identified 
from the literature as reflecting safety commitment (decision-making, communication, active 
involvement, influence on organisational attributes and safety values) and coding rules.  After 
independently coding 50% of the questionnaires, the raters evaluated most of the responses that 
did not fit into the pre-defined coding categories as reflecting interpersonal leadership 
(transformational and transactional leadership, Bass, 1985; authentic leadership style, Avolio, 
Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans & May, 2004) and collaboration with external bodies (e.g. 
regulators, universities).  It was agreed to extend the coding scheme with these additional 
constructs.  The final interrater reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) was α = 0.90 (95% CI 
0.85 to 0.95).   
Safety knowledge. Safety knowledge was assessed through three open questions that 
referred to facts and information, as well as theoretical and practical understanding of air traffic 
safety (see Appendix).  Open questions are regarded as a valid method to assess knowledge 
(Dochy, Segers & Buehl, 1999).  The questions were devised with the help of subject matter 
experts.   
Following the counting rules by Dean et al. (2006), the raters counted the number of issues 
generated by participants and how many of these issues were correct.  Correct responses were 
identified through statistics from the industry and the safety culture literature.  These included 
the EASA (2010) aviation safety report to determine the most frequent incident types in ATM, 
a list indicating the contributing factors to loss of separation (HERA) and three safety culture 
models (Mearns & Kirwan, 2011; Pidgeon, 1991; Reason, 1997).  Inter-rater reliability for the 
safety knowledge ratings ranged between ICC = .85 and ICC = .89.   
SENIOR MANAGERS’ SAFETY COMMITMENT 9 
Two measures of safety knowledge were generated: the number of correct responses (safety 
knowledge) and the accuracy of the responses (safety knowledge accuracy).  The safety 
knowledge score reflects the overall number of correct responses.  The safety knowledge 
accuracy score represents a quotient of the number of correct responses and the number of 
overall issues mentioned by participants (similar to a percent correct score, e.g. Knowlton & 
Squire, 1993)1.  Cronbach’s alpha for the three items that measured safety knowledge was α = 
.72 and α =.70 for safety knowledge accuracy.   
Problem-solving and social competence.  Problem-solving and social competence were 
assessed through two scenarios each (based on Zaccaro, Mumford, Connely, Marks & Gilbert, 
2000).  Such constructed response measures are described as controlled simulations that 
produce similar results as highly complex, realistic simulations (Motowidlo, Dunnette & 
Carter, 1990).  By providing two scenarios, observations could be made across two different 
situations, increasing the content validity of the data.  The scenarios were developed and tested 
in a pilot study with senior managers (N=10).  First, the scenarios were generated using 
triggering response measures and critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) with a subsample 
(n=4).  The developed scenarios’ validity was then tested with a subsample of senior managers 
(n=6) using content analysis (Mayring, 2000).  Results showed the two problem-solving 
scenarios primarily triggered responses identifiable by two coders as reflecting problem solving 
(54% and 71% of responses) and the social competence scenarios primarily triggered responses 
identified as social competence (62% and 75% of the responses).  Because Zaccaro et al. (2000) 
describe specific questions as facilitating the application of a skill and increasing the reliability 
of the coding, we prompted participants to aspects of problem solving and social competence.  
                                                          
1 For instance, when a participant provided three possible contributors to loss of separation, out of 
which two were correct (i.e. on the HERA list), he or she scored a two on the safety knowledge scale 
and a 0.66 (2/3) on the safety knowledge accuracy scale.   
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Table 1 shows two of the four scenarios used in this study as well as the questions used as cues 
for each type of scenario. 
For problem-solving, participants were prompted with two questions to understanding the 
problem and idea generation (see Table 1).  The number of issues and ideas generated by 
participants that matched with a list of responses provided by two subject matter experts (using 
counting rules by Dean et al., 2006) were counted.  Because Mumford, Vessey and Barret 
(2008) propose scales accounting for the problem-solving process and the specific domain of 
the problem as especially suitable measures, the coders further assessed the number of 
information sources that the participants referred to while working on understanding the 
problem (e.g. data, other managers, and workforce) and identified for the content of generated 
ideas as either cultural (e.g. awareness campaigns, visits to the workforce) or technical (e.g. 
changes to equipment, changes to the airspace design).  Inter-rater reliability (ICC) for the 
problem-solving measures ranged between .74 and .87.   
For social competence, participants were prompted with two questions to social perception 
and persuasion (see Table 1).  Perceiving others was assessed by counting the number of 
possible reasons generated by participants (cf. Jones & Day, 1997) using counting rules by 
Dean et al. (2006).  Within social perception, the coders identified how many of the issues 
generated were technical issues (e.g. issues with the safety management system, the technical 
systems involved) and how many were social issues (e.g. stress, conflicts in team or at home).  
The number of persuasive moves was identified based on the persuasive strategies by Yukl, 
Falbe and Youn (1993) and counting rules by Dean et al. (2006).  Interrater reliability (ICC) 
for the social competence measures ranged between .75 and .93.  
2.3 Results 
Previous studies using similar interview methods (e.g. Zaccaro et al., 2000) limited the 
time that participants had to respond to questions.  It was decided not to apply such 
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constraints as it seemed inappropriate with a multi-national sample of senior managers.  The 
response length was controlled for by calculating a ratio of the number of issues identified by 
the coders and the number of words in each response for all interview measures.  As these 
ratios were very small, they were then multiplied by 100, to obtain presentable values.   
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that the data were not normally distributed (D (49) 
ranging between 0.14 and 0.51; all p< .01).  The selective sample of senior managers and the 
ratios that were calculated might have contributed to limited variation in the data and a skewed 
distribution.  Accordingly, the data were analysed using non-parametric tests, namely 
Kendall’s Tau.   
The correlations shown in Table 2 indicate that three aspects of problems solving were 
related to safety commitment, namely understanding problems (r = .31, p <. 01), the 
information sources considered when understanding a problem (r = .35, p <. 01) and idea 
generation (r = .19, p <. 05).  Furthermore, a significant correlation of perceiving others with 
safety commitment could be identified (r = .20, p <. 05).   
Subsequently, we inspected participants’ responses for the three aspects of problem-solving 
and perceiving others that matched with the responses that had been provided by the subject 
matter experts.  Participants most frequently mentioned ‘work load’ (ƒ = 22), ‘work conditions’ 
(ƒ = 19; e.g. patterns in the traffic, airspace design issues, heat or noise in the control room) 
‘shift management’ (ƒ = 14), or ‘negotiation of new contracts (ƒ = 11) as causing the problem 
described in the scenario (see Table 3).  The most frequently mentioned information sources 
were ‘data figures and reports’ (ƒ = 15), ‘speaking to the controllers’ (often the supervisors, ƒ 
= 12) as well as ‘involving experts’ (such as human factors or health experts; ƒ =9).  The types 
of ideas listed in Table 3 most frequently suggested changes to the shift schedule (ƒ = 16) as a 
possible way to solve this problem, followed by involve the controllers (ƒ = 11).   
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Table 4 illustrates the types of responses that were given for perceiving others.  Both these 
examples illustrate a general pattern in the responses as most participants considered both, 
issues at work (e.g. being overlooked in a promotion round, no being heard, comments not 
welcomed) as well as personal issues (e.g. issues at home, health problems) as leading the 
manager to act this way.   
Table 5 shows that 87% of the responses were identified by both raters as the behaviours 
previously identified from the literature, suggesting that these behaviours captured the data 
well.  Most frequently, participants’ responses reflected personal involvement (ƒ = 52), 
followed by influencing organisational attributes (ƒ = 34) and communication about safety (ƒ 
= 23).  Decision-making (ƒ = 15), leadership (ƒ = 14), showing safety values (ƒ = 7) and 
collaboration with external bodies (ƒ =6) were indicated less frequently.   
4. Discussion  
This study considered problem-solving, social competence and safety knowledge as 
relevant for senior managers’ engagement in behaviours that demonstrate their safety 
commitment.  The results suggest problem-solving, namely the number of issues considered 
when investigating problems, the information sources used to understand problems, the 
generation of ideas to solve problems as well as understanding others’ intentions (social 
competence) as related to demonstrations of safety commitment.  Safety knowledge did not 
relate to behaviours that reflect safety commitment.  Additionally, an inspection of the 
behaviours that senior managers reported to use to demonstrate safety commitment showed 
personal involvement, influence on organisational attributes and communication about safety 
as most frequently referred to behaviours.   
Descriptions of senior managerial work emphasise that it requires managers to deal with 
large amounts of information and describes this aspect as one of the main challenges of their 
work (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1998).  Finding the ability to understand problems, 
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including the consideration of many different issues and sources of information, as related to 
behaviours that demonstrate safety commitment highlights the centrality of dealing with 
information to solve problems as also relevant for this group’s influence on safety.   
‘Idea generation’ was also related to demonstrations of safety commitment.  The content of 
the solutions generated by participants contained short (e.g. re-organisation of the airspace) 
and long term solutions (e.g. change the shift management) and focused on cultural or social 
as well as technical issues.  This finding highlights senior managers’ safety commitment as 
related to both aspects of the socio-technical concept of organisational safety (Turner, 1978).  
Accordingly, demonstrations of safety commitment are likely to benefit from considering 
cultural issues when solving a problem (e.g. involving the controllers) as well as technological 
changes (e.g. changes to the airspace).  Overall, the relevance of problem-solving found in this 
study supports Zohar and Luria’s (2005) evaluation of this skill as centrally contributing to 
behaviours that reflect management’s safety commitment.   
Perceiving others, but not persuasion was related to safety commitment in this study (in 
line with suggestions by Hopkins, 2011).  This illustrates the ability to understand others 
intentions and emotions as more central to safety related interactions with the workforce and 
colleagues for senior managers than the ability to persuade them.  Persuasion is described in 
the literature as a core element of leadership (Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, 1994), however this 
was not found to be the case in relation to safety commitment in this study.  It appears that 
senior managers can more effectively demonstrate their safety commitment by showing 
concern for others and care about their employee (as described for leadership and safety 
generally by Zohar, 2010). However, before such a conclusion can be drawn, the following 
issues should be considered.  First, despite the scenario validation, the scenarios might have 
not allowed participants to apply persuasion, but rather problem-solving using social 
information (as Zaccaro et al. (2000) had used similar scenarios to trigger social judgement 
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skills).  Furthermore, it is possible that, while persuasion might not be related to behaviours 
that reflect safety commitment, it might influence organisational safety directly or through 
other mechanisms.   
Although safety knowledge has previously been shown to contribute to safety related 
performance at lower levels in organisations (e.g. Griffin & Neal, 2000), the results of this 
study indicated it as not strongly influencing safety commitment at the senior level.  It is 
possible, that safety commitment, as a form of dedication to safety is not driven by knowledge 
about safety.  Knowledge about an issue does not necessarily inform behavioural choices 
(Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008).  The assessment of knowledge used in this study focussed on 
the retrieval of facts and information and theoretical understanding, but did not include the 
application of such knowledge, which might have been more relevant to the ability of showing 
safety commitment.   
2.4.1 Strengths, limitations and future research 
This study achieved unique access to an under-researched sample in the safety literature 
(Flin, 2003).  The sample represented a good proportion of the targeted group (i.e. just under 
30% of all organisations from EUROCONTROL member states).  Furthermore, this study was 
carried out with participants from different nationalities.  Research that includes multi-national 
samples can be evaluated as especially relevant in the 21st century, as more and more 
organisations operate in more than one culture (Triandis, 2006).  Nonetheless, the sample size 
was small from a data analysis point of view and the study suffered from low power.  
Accordingly, only correlations and descriptive qualitative results are reported in this study, as 
the sample size did not allow for more rigorous analysis (such as regression).  Furthermore, it 
was not possible to account for non-linear relationships in our analysis.  We propose that the 
results reported in this study nonetheless, give an indication of the ways in which skills and 
knowledge might influence safety commitment.   
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The inter-rater reliability of the findings was ensured through the co-coding of the 
interviews.  Furthermore, the coding of problem-solving and safety knowledge were based on 
objective criteria.  A further strength of this study was the development and validation of 
measures and scenarios suitable for a senior manager sample.  By presenting two scenarios and 
multiple questions for skills and knowledge respectively, the stability of the responses was 
considered.  Despite the validation of the scenarios, an issue with the social competence 
measurement pertained to the scenarios’ content validity, as these were based on scenarios that 
had previously been used to assess social judgement skills by Zaccaro et al. (2000).   
Because senior managers’ safety commitment is usually defined through the way this is 
perceived by the workforce (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2004), not using upward appraisal to measure 
safety commitment represents a weakness of this study.  Unfortunately, the participating 
organizations were not able to provide access to the participants’ subordinates.  The majority 
of behaviours described as ways to demonstrate safety commitment in this study matched 
behaviours that are considered in the literature as behaviours that affect safety commitment 
perceptions of subordinates.  This suggests that the behaviours obtained from senior managers 
themselves might not be that different from behaviours that their subordinates might view as 
indicators of safety commitment.  
It is unclear whether the results found in this high reliability industry can be generalized to 
other high reliability industries (such as nuclear power production) or high risk industries (such 
as oil and gas).  Future research should further investigate the influence of traits and skills on 
safety commitment using a longitudinal design in order to ensure that the relations found in 
this cross-sectional design follow the proposed direction.  Results from this study cannot 
identify whether skills and knowledge lead to more diverse demonstrations of safety 
commitment or whether a higher commitment to safety drives acquisition of skills and 
knowledge relevant to safety.   
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Finally, future research should consider the influence of organisational structures and 
characteristics on the ways in which senior managers can impact safety.  It is likely that some 
organisational structures will amplify, attenuate, as well as reduce the impact of senior 
mangers’ safety signals.  Managerial latitude of action has been proposed by Hambrick (2007) 
as a moderator of the extent to which managerial characteristics affect organisations.   
4.2 Conclusion and practical implications 
Given the relevance of senior managers’ safety commitment for organisational safety, this 
study’s investigation of skills’ and knowledge’s contribution to behaviours that reflect this 
attitude has practical as well as theoretical implications.  The advantage of investigating skills 
and knowledge is that they are developed through practice (Landy & Conte, 2004), suggesting 
they can be targeted in interventions.  Consequently, this study’s findings can provide evidence 
for training and best practice sharing, as well as future research.  According to this study’s 
findings, aspects of managerial problem-solving and social competence should be targeted by 
safety related guidance or training and can be proposed as a relevant topic for further 
investigation.  Senior managers can be stimulated to develop their ability to understand safety 
problems, to consider different types of information sources, to creatively generate solutions 
for safety problems and to be sensitive to others’ intentions and issues as this is likely to support 
their demonstration of safety commitment.    
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Table 1 
Social competence and problem-solving measures 
Social competence  
You are the CEO of a European ANSP, and the following issue has been brought to 
your attention. You have recently noticed changes in the behaviour of one of your 
managers during a Board meeting. The manager does not participate as actively in the 
meeting as he used to, even when issues relevant to his domain are being discussed. 
When asked about some of the topics discussed, he does not speak up to clarify his 
views as he would normally do. His performances on the recently assessed KPIs were 
adequate.  
 
1. Social perception: What do you think are possible reasons why the manager acts 
this way?  
2. Persuasion: How would you approach the manager and talk to him/her? How do 
you persuade him/ her?  
Problem-solving  
You are the CEO of a European ANSP, and the following issue has been brought to 
your attention. Recently controllers in your ANSP complain more about fatigue and 
you also have noticed that mistakes during clearance have occurred more often. 
Furthermore, recently more reliance on short term conflict alerts has been reported, 
and a higher rate of TCAS alerts has been reported. Informally, controllers are 
concerned that they are pushing the envelope too far, though quarterly reports indicate 
that incident rates have remained the same.  Two of the low-cost airlines have 
complained about ATC induced delays and ‘inflexibility’ when responding to pilot 
requests. 
 
1. Understanding the problem: What do you think are possible issues here?  
2. Generating ideas: What ideas do you have, how this issue could be resolved?  









Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Safety commitment  1.40 0.98            
2. ‘Understanding the problem’ 0.51 0.35 .31**           
3. ‘Understanding the problem’ -info 
sources 0.12 0.16 .35
** .20*          
4. ‘Idea generation’ 0.73 0.41 .19* .22* .05         
5. ‘Idea generation’ technical 0.23 0.33 .10 .19* -.10 .28**        
6. ‘Idea generation’ cultural 0.29 0.28 .09 .06 .22* .33** -.02       
7. Social perception  1.31 1.81 .20* .29** .04 .05 .12 .12      
8. Technical insights  0.65 0.77 .10 .21* -.05 .05 .09 .21* .45**     
9. Social insights  0.53 0.95 .12 .14* .09 .00 .14 .00 .66** .17    
10. Persuasion 0.79 0.58 .06 .11 .10 .17 -.02 .26** .17 .14 .16   
11. Safety knowledge 0.44 0.44 .14 .23** .16 .19* .07 .17 .25** .07 .23* .16  
12. Safety knowledge accuracy 75.72 19.57 .04 -.03 .06 .01 -.02 .06 .02 -.18 .10 .10 .11 
Note: n = 60, * p<.05, **p<.01 
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Table 3 
Examples of responses coded for problem-solving  
Understanding the problem 
Workload issues (ƒ = 22) 
Work conditions and environment (traffic peaks, design in airspace, ƒ = 19) 
Shift management (ƒ = 14) 
Negotiation of new contracts/ union issues (ƒ = 11) 
Staff shortages (incl. increased sick calls, ƒ = 11) 
New system (technology) or procedures introduced (ƒ = 9) 
Break patterns/ time in front of screen (ƒ = 9) 
Changes to the shift management (ƒ = 8) 
Personal conflicts in the teams or with management (ƒ = 7) 
Traffic complexity (ƒ = 5) 
Cultural issues (i.e. changes in the reporting culture; ƒ = 3) 
Information sources 
Look for and analyze the data, figures and reports (ƒ = 15) 
The controllers (ƒ = 12) 
Experts (ƒ = 9) 
Data (ƒ = 6) 
Safety manager (ƒ = 3) 
Airline reports (ƒ = 3) 
The unions (ƒ = = 2) 
Observations & tapes (ƒ = 2) 
Idea Generation 
Improve the shift schedule and look at breaks (ƒ = 16) 
Involve the controllers to develop a solution together (ƒ = 11) 
Carry out a safety assessment/ more detailed investigation (ƒ = 9) 
Re-organize the airspace/ flow control measures (ƒ = 8) 
Bring in more controllers (ƒ = 4) 
Specially investigate peaks in the traffic (ƒ = 3) 
Talk to the airlines/ the costumers (ƒ = 2) 
Note: Examples are given for the scenario presented in Table 1only (excludes frequencies from second 
problem-solving scenario); included issues had been mentioned by more than one participant and correspond 
with subject matter expert list
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Table 4 
Example quotes for perceiving others  
- “Problems at home? Health problems and maybe it is something that he or she doesn’t like to speak 
about until he or she is certain about the position. Maybe some ahem it might be some changes in the 
management level and ahem he could have anticipated he might be next. That is a possible scenario 
when someone is quiet.  Or ahem or even the communication was cut in a certain way that he tried to 
speak up several times and he was shut down by the others so he doesn’t feel like he is part of the 
board. So five reasons.” 
- “He could be ill, he could have domestic problems, he could have had a discussion with somebody 
where he has been told that his interventions are not welcome ahem he thinks that the risk 
assessments were not made adequately. To be honest with you there are a million things that could be 
wrong with this person why he isn't participating, he may believe that he is usually very active at the 
meetings and he has been told that he is taking up too much time, he maybe told him that his 
interventions are not relevant, he may be told that whatever, his particular area isn't s important as 
other areas so whatever, so it is a very human situation.” 
Note: Examples are given for the scenario presented in Table 1only  
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Table 5.  
Behaviours reflecting safety commitment  
Construct Frequency Example 
Decision-making 15 (10%) 
First of all I don’t rush towards any conclusions. Until I have an as 
much as possible full view of the facts. The danger in safety is, to take 
a very prejudiced decision, based on some very, very weak information.  
  
Apart from planning what we have to improve, when we have 
problems, have to change something or to make improvements we 
think a lot first. We also justify how it will be beneficial for the 
operations and only after we are very sure that the benefits are more 
than the risks of this change, we go with this change. 
Personal 
involvement  52 (34%) 
We get some of the simplest little issues. You have to deal with them 
just as if they are the most important thing in that person’s life. And 
you got to talk to them and you have to find out about it. 
  I have sleepless nights if something is not running. 
  
If somebody came here asking me to look at an issue and I asked him to 
go away I think I would be doing something seriously wrong. I might 
have to say to them, I can't look at it straight away, is that ok, but I will 
put it on my list. 
Communication 23 (15%) So some of it is about the conversations that I have so I would always walk into the ops room and ask people how the operation is running, 
  
But of course it requires […] that I tell them on a regular basis and on 
the occasion of some projects: Has this been covered, did you look at 
that, did you make a safety assessment? 
Showing safety 
values 7 (5%) 
There is nothing too small and there is nothing too big when you are 
dealing with safety. 





First, I think training is very important, all aspects in relation to safety 
training for everyone. We send our controllers to all these trainings and 
workshops. 
  Well, we have processes in place: it starts with a safety menu and a safety management system that we have in place. 
Leadership 13 (9%) So the actions are a number of things. One is visibility, being seen, known. The other is being approachable. 
  
One of them is about being brave, is about standing up and saying: this 
is what I think might be possible, or this is my view. So you are kind of 
putting yourself out there. People know you are out there. It is that 
leadership again, where you are out there and then you start to enrol 
people in the vision that you have got. 
Boundary 
spanning 6 (4%) 
Then we had some studies as well that found, perhaps some surprising 
attitude statistics, for young people and more experienced people. […] I 
think this will help more and more to have knowledge in this area and 
get information from the universities. 
  Discussions here involve the unions as well. 
  Very important is also cooperation with the director of civil aviation, the regulator and other agencies.  
 





Commitment to safety 
From your point of view in what ways can you show your commitment to safety? 
 
Safety Knowledge 
What are the most frequent incident types in Europe? 
What are explanatory factors to loss of separation in Europe?  
What are the main ingredients (or components) of the safety culture of your ANSP? 
 
 
